What our age needs...is not a new contribution to the system but a subjective thinker who relates himself to existing qua Christian just as Socrates related himself to existing qua human being (CUP2 77; Pap. 
dinary about this passage. Im m ediately after h e claims that h e stands alone in C h ristend om , Kierkegaard makes the perhaps even m ore remarkable claim that there does exist o n e person prior to h im w h o se activity is analo gous: "T h e on ly analogy I have before m e is Socrates; m y task is a Socratic task, to audit the defin ition o f w h at it is to be a C hristian" (M 341; S V t 14, 352). T hat is, Kierkegaard claims that Socrates, a n o n -C h ristia n pagan philosopher, is his o n e true predecessor, that Socrates' philosoph ical activity is the on ly th ing analogous to his activity as a w riter and thinker, such that w e should co n ceive o f his task-supposedly u n iq ue w ith in C hristianity-as a Socratic task. I think this is a remarkable claim . I f Socrates really provides the on ly analogy to Kierkegaard and i f K ierkegaard's task truly is as thor o u gh ly Socratic as he seem s to be suggesting, th en w e m ay b e in the pres en ce here o f a th o u gh t that ultim ately has the potential to revolution ize the very w ay w e think about Kierkegaard and h o w w e approach his texts. Thus while Aristophanes may be held to be closer to the truth than either Xenophon or Plato, Kierkegaard nevertheless does not think that any contemporary of Socrates has accurately depict ed him; nor, for that matter, that anyone else has an accurate conception of him: the ultimate aim of his dissertation is to argue that it is only Søren Kierkegaard who has actually arrived at the truth about Socrates.
II. Kierkegaard's Socratic Stance: "I am N o t a C hristian" T h e idea that

in w h ic h he is w ise is that h e "do[es] n o t th ink [he] know [s] w h a t [he] do[es] n o t know ," and w h o believes that the g o d ordered h im to
But where does this leave my original claim about Plato's Apology? Interestingly, Kierkegaard places the Apology in a special class of its own, apart from Plato's other writings (and so, I would argue, apart from the criticism raised against Plato in the third thesis), calling it "an historical doc ument" that "must be assigned a preeminent place when the purely Socratic is sought" (Cl 16; SKS 1,134). Kierkegaard's whole argument depends on the not unreasonable view that there is some thing special about the Apology when it comes to our understanding of who Socrates is. For Kierkegaard, this text is akin to a kind of window through which we actually are brought face to face with Socrates himself. He writes, "For me the most important point is that a reliable picture of the actual Socrates is seen in the Apology.. ..in this work we do have, according to the view of the great majority, a historical representation of Socrates' actuality" (Cl 80, SKS 1,138; C l 126, SKS 1, 177, italics mine; both trans, modified). As the argument of The Concept of Irony unfolds (pro ceeding from Kierkegaard's treatment of the contemporary sources, to his discussion of Socrates' trial, to his discussion of Socrates' world-historical significance), Kierkegaard repeatedly appeals to the Apology and treats it as something like the final authority upon which any conception of Socrates must rest.This means in effect that whether we are ultimately convinced by Kierkegaard's overall argument in his dissertation will in large part depend on whether we are convinced by his reading of Plato's Apology itself, which he provocatively claims "is in its entirety an ironic work" 21a; cf. 33c). On Socrates' daimonion:"I have a divine or spiritual sign which Meletus has ridiculed in his deposition. This began when I was a child. It is a voice, and whenever it speaks it turns me away from something I am about to do, but it never encourages me to do anything" (Ap. 3 Id; cf.
40a-c).
14. See Ap. 21b-23b.
15. On the young men: "The young men who follow me around of their own free will, those who have most leisure, the sons of the very rich, take pleasure in hearing people questioned....They enjoy hearing those being questioned who think they are wise, but are not. And this is not unpleas ant" (Ap. 23c; 33c).
16. Ap. 2Id; 28e-29a. Socrates claims that it is because he has pursued this god-given task that he has not been a conventionally model public servant and that his own personal affairs have been neg lected: "Because of this occupation, I do not have the leisure to engage in public affairs to any extent, nor indeed to look after my own, but I live in great poverty because of my service to the god" (Ap. 23b; cf. 31b-c). On being a gadfly:"I was attached to the city by the god-though this seems a ridiculous thing to say-as upon a great and noble horse which was somewhat sluggish because of its size and needed to be stirred up by a kind of gadfly. It is to fulfill some such func tion that I believe the god has placed me in the city" (Ap. 30e).
17. Myles Burnyeat, e.g., argues that "readers are invited.. .to reach a verdict on the case before [them]" ("The Impiety of Socrates," Ancient Philosophy 17, 1997, pp. 1-12, p. 2). If we were to imagine Socrates' defense as a monologue he performed on stage, then it might be natural for him to speak to the audience as though they constituted his jury (where Plato, of course, would be the playwright/director).With the invention of paper and the printing press, this audience becomes more and more the isolated, individual reader, thus perhaps better approximating the individual inter locutors whom Socrates seeks to engage qua individuals:"For I do know how to produce one wit ness to whatever I'm saying, and that's the man I'm having a discussion with.The majority I disre gard. And I do know how to call for a vote from one man, but I don't even discuss things with the -d ; see also, e.g., 28b, 29c-e, 34c, 37e). It will be quite natural, as a reader, to slip into a frame of mind in which one treats Socrates' use of the second per son "you" as also directed at oneself. For example,"I shall not cease to practice philosophy, to exhort you and in my usual way to point out to any one of you whom I happen to meet:'Good Sir, you are an Athenian, a citizen of the greatest city with the greatest reputation for both wisdom and power; are you not ashamed of your eagerness to possess as much wealth, reputation and honors as possible, while you do not care for nor give thought to wisdom or truth, or the best possible state of your soul?'Then, if one of you disputes this and says he does care, I shall not let him go at once or leave him, but I shall question him, examine him and test him, and if I do not think he has attained the goodness that he says he has, I shall reproach him because he attaches little importance to the most important things and greater importance to inferior things....Be sure that this is what the god orders me to do, and I think there is no greater blessing for the city than my service to the god" (Ap. 29d-30b ).
18. In general Plato does not cast himself as a character in his writings.The Apology is one of two places within his corpus where he is mentioned by name, and the one place where Plato stresses that hethe author of the text in question-was present at the set of events his text purports to represent (see Ap. 38b, 34a; Plato, Phaedo, 59b) .While this device in no way ensures that what is represented is somehow more veridical (for there are plenty of uses of this device by ancient authors where we have independent reasons for thinking that the author in question could not have been present), the fact that Plato only avails himself of this device once in his entire corpus surely suggests that he attaches a special significance to asserting that he was in fact a first-hand witness of Socrates' defense.
19. The one exception being perhaps the young men who follow Socrates around and who enjoy lis tening to him examine those reputed to be wise. Kierkegaard does not present himself as someone who has had such followers, but he remains deeply interested in the youth and the problems a Socrates faces when seeking to interact with them. See, e.g., his discussion of Alcibiades at C l 47- Other Philosophical Lectures and Essays, London, Macmillan, 1905, pp. 323-371) . He claims that even within Plato's corpus we ought to distinguish between (1) Sophists like Protagoras who claim to teach the art of virtue and who prefer delivering speeches to the give and take of Socrates' question-and-answer approach and (2) those Sophists who more closely "ape" Socrates' own methods and so represent a "post-Socratic Sophistry" (caricatured in Plato's Euthydemus) where "instead of pretentious and hollow rhetoric we have perverse and fallacious dialectic" (pp. 343,334). Sidgwick further calls into question the legitimacy of assimilating Callicles and Thrasymachus (open defenders of an egoistic moral skepticism) to the first group of Sophists. It may be worth noting, howev er, that this latter claim seems partly to rest on Sidgwick's being under the impression that Plato does not portray Protagoras as someone Socrates attacks because his doctrines are "novel or dan gerous" but only because they are "superficial and commonplace," a view Kierkegaard surely would not be alone in rejecting (p. 360; cf. Plato, Meno, 9le).
21. It should be noted, however, that one dissimilarity between the pastors and theologians under crit icism by Kierkegaard and the Sophists of Socrates' day is that while the former are part of the offi cial establishment and as such were generally recognized as legitimate authorities, the latter were usually outsiders who traveled to Athens and who were often viewed with considerable suspicion by those in power. Cf. Anytus' discussion of the Sophists in Plato's Meno (91b-92c).
22. At the close of "My Task," Kierkegaard addresses the common man (menige Mand) and warns him to "avoid the pastors, avoid them, those abominations whose job is to hinder you in even becom ing aware of what true Christianity is and thereby to turn you, muddled by gibberish and illusion, into what they understand by a true Christian, a contributing member of the state Church, the national Church, and the like. Avoid them; only see to it that you willingly and promptly pay them the money they are to have. One must at no price have money differences with someone one scorns, lest it be said that one was avoiding them in order to get out of paying. No, pay them dou ble so that your disagreement with them can become obvious: that what concerns them does not concern you at all, money, and that, on the contrary, what does not concern them concerns you infinitely, Christianity" (M 347; SV1 14, 357).
23. In the Apology Socrates makes clear that independent of any danger the Sophists may represent, he takes it to be the case that the Athenian populace as a whole (which after all, in the form of the jury, will put him to death) is itself a significant force: "Do not be angry with me for speaking the truth; no man will survive who genuinely opposes you or any other crowd and prevents the occur rence of many unjust and illegal happenings in the city. A man who really fights for justice must lead a private, not a public, life if he is to survive for even a short time" (A p. 31e-32a). In Plato's Republic, this topic of the relationship between the individual Sophists and the larger Athenian soci ety is returned to: "Do you agree with the general opinion that certain young people are actually corrupted by sophists-that there are certain sophists with significant influence on the young who corrupt them through private teaching? Isn't it rather the very people who say this who are the greatest sophists of all...? ....Not one of those paid private teachers, whom the people call sophists..., teaches anything other than the convictions that the majority express when they are gathered together. Indeed, these are precisely what the sophists call wisdom. It's as if someone were learning the moods and appetites of a huge, strong beast that he's rearing-how to approach and handle it, when it is most difficult to deal with or most gentle and what makes it so, what sounds it utters in either condition, and what sounds soothe or anger it. Having learned all this through tending the beast over a period of time, he calls this knack wisdom, gathers his information togeth er as if it were a craft, and starts to teach it. In truth, he knows nothing about which of these con victions is fine or shameful, good or bad, just or unjust, but applies all these names in accordance with how the beast reacts-calling what it enjoys good and what angers it bad" (492a-493c).
24. Thus refusing to call himself a Christian is, in part, an expression of Kierkegaard's religious con victions and may be tied to his idea that one never is a Christian in this life, though each person certainly can embark on the lifelong task of becoming a Christian.
25. The Danish verb phrase "indbilde sig" can also mean to be under an illusion or under a delusion.
Those who are under the illusion that they already are something will not be in the practice of examining whether they really are that, nor will they set about trying to become something that they think they already are.
26. Kierkegaard frequently characterizes his task in terms of these two dimensions, so that one and the same activity is partly constitutive of what in his own case he takes to be an authentic life while also being directed at helping others to gain a greater awareness of the lack of fit between their avowed commitments and how they actually live. As a result, he argues that his method of approach has an intrinsic worth to it independent of how successful it is with his interlocutors, since it helps constitute his own life whether or not, in the end, it manages to make the others more aware:"That is why this approach has intrinsic worth. Ordinarily it holds true that an approach has worth only in proportion to what is achieved by it. One judges and condemns, makes a big noise-this has no intrinsic worth, but one reckons on achieving a great deal thereby. It is different with the approach described here. Assume that a person had devoted his whole life to using it, assume that he had practiced it all his life, and assume that he had achieved nothing-he nevertheless has by no means lived in vain,because his life was true self-denial" (P V 44; S V t 13,532-533; cf. C U P 277-278; SKS 7,251-254).
27. Ap. 31a.The idea that a philosophers primary role is to serve as a gadfly for her fellow citizens is rather removed from how philosophy tends to be thought of these days. Reminding ourselves that
Socrates thought of his philosophical activity in these terms will better position us to appreciate the sense in which Kierkegaard might readily call himself a philosopher in spite of his general ten dency to ridicule and set himself against most modern forms of philosophy.
28. Socrates' ignorance has remained an enduring source of puzzlement; this is especially so for philosophers since ignorance is normally thought to be a condition that philosophy helps one to overcome. It might seem that insofar as Socrates remains ignorant he lies outside the proper province of philosophy. One might even feel like asserting, "If Socrates is still ignorant after seven ty years isn't this reason enough to admit that his method is inadequate at best and ultimately a fail ure?" In his essay, "Socrates' Disavowal of Knowledge," Gregory Vlastos nicely captures this senti ment and brings into view the seemingly inherent tension between Socrates' unvarying stance of ignorance and his presentation of himself as a virtuous person: "If after decades of searching Socrates remained convinced that he still knew nothing, would not further searching have become a charade-or rather worse? For he holds that virtue 'is' knowledge: if he has no knowledge, his life is a disaster, he has missed out on virtue and, therewith, on happiness. How is it then that he is serenely confident he has achieved both? [In a footnote to this passage:] His avowals of epistemic inadequacy, frequent in the dialogues, are never paralleled by admission of moral failure; the asym metry is striking" (in Socratic Studies, ed., Myles Burnyeat, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1994, pp. 39-66, p. 43) . Socrates' stance of ignorance is sometimes treated as a rhetorical device that he uses to draw out his interlocutor. Norman Gulley, e.g., claims that Socrates' profession of igno rance is "an expedient to encourage his interlocutor to seek out the truth, to make him think he is joining with Socrates in a voyage of discovery" (quoted by Vlastos, p. 39). Hence his stance of ignorance is sometimes called a mere ironic pose; consider this common dictionary definition of Socratic irony: "pretense of ignorance in a discussion to expose the fallacies in the opponent's logic" (Webster's New World College Dictionary, 4th edition, ed., Michael Agnes, Cleveland, Wiley Publishing, 2002, p. 755) . In the Repw6/ir,Thrasymachus is just as suspicious of Socrates' claim to be ignorant, only he treats it as a tactic adopted by Socrates to avoid having to be questioned by oth ers: "By Heracles, [Thrasymachus] said, that's just Socrates' usual irony. I knew, and I said so to these people earlier, that you'd be unwilling to answer and that, if someone questioned you, you'd be ironical and do anything rather than give an answer" (337a). In contrast to these positions Kierkegaard, who is best known for having argued in his dissertation that Socrates is an ironist through and through, never conceives of Socrates' ignorance as feigned or merely tactical, as though it did not go all the way down. See, e.g., SKS 1, [217] [218] [219] [220] [221] [222] [223] [224] And when he does submit to this questioning, you don't realize that Socrates will not let him go before he has well and truly tested every last detail" (187e-188a; cf. Ap. 29e-30a).
30. One definition of sophistry might be any approach to ethical and religious matters that fosters the illusion that a theoretical knowledge of such matters is possible independent of the practical under standing that one only acquires by living a certain kind of life. Kierkegaard believes that with the rise in his day of Hegelian philosophy a new species of sophistry is born, a sophistry that holds out the promise of a systematic, theoretical comprehension of ethical and religious matters while at the same time leading individuals to neglect the proper realm of ethics and religion: namely the indi vidual herself qua ethical and religious agent. Within Kierkegaard's corpus, the main attack against this Hegelian species of sophistry is launched by the pseudonymous author Johannes Climacus in his two books Philosophical Fragments and Concluding Unscientific Postscript.
31.
Ap. 22e-23a; cf. 23c-24b and Plato, Theaetetus, 151c, where Socrates claims that "people have often before now got into such a state with me as to be literally ready to bite when I take away some nonsense or other from them." Recall that in the Apology Socrates claims that his life as a philoso pher was given a certain impetus by the oracle's claim that no one is wiser than he is. Socrates finds this a puzzling remark and treats it as a kind of riddle set him by the god. He doesn't think he is an especially wise person but he also thinks he ought to take quite seriously the god's pronounce ment. Accordingly, after remaining puzzled for quite a while, he reluctantly turns to what seems to come quite naturally to him, to the activity of questioning and refuting, thinking that in this way he might arrive at some kind of an answer to the god's riddle. Socrates claims that he then pro ceeded to seek out people who were reputed to be wise, initially with the idea that he might dis cover someone who is wiser than he is. But we all know how the story goes. Instead of making this kind of discovery, Socrates repeatedly encounters people who think they know things they do not and then tries to show this to the individuals in question. This does not always make him the most popular of individuals. Consider his description of his first such encounter, whose generic form nicely captures the basic type of exchange that he claims has led to a climate of hostility in which people have repeatedly slandered him: "W hen I examined this man...my experience was something like this: I thought that he appeared wise to many people and especially to himself, but he was not. I then tried to show him that he thought himself wise, but that he was not. As a result he came to dislike me, and so did many of the bystanders" (Ap. 21c-d). It is this condition of being "unpopular with many people" that Socrates says will lead to his "undoing, if [he] is undone, not Meletus or Anytus but the slanders and envy of many people" (Ap. 28a).
32. Given the inductive nature of Socrates' enterprise, the strength of his convictions will partly rest on the quality of the interlocutor he encounters, providing him perhaps with further reason for trying to foster a philosophical culture in Athens in which someone might arise who could truly test him, a Socrates who could test Socrates (Plato arguably tries to fulfill that very role over the course of his writings): "These conclusions, at which we arrived earlier in our previous discussions are, I'd say, held down by arguments of iron and adamant, even if it's rather rude to say so. So it would seem, anyhow. And if you [Callicles] or someone more forceful than you won't undo them, then anyone who says anything other than what I'm now saying cannot be speaking well. And yet for my part, my account is ever the same: I don't know how these things are, but no one I've ever met, as in this case, can say anything else without being ridiculous" (Grg. 508e-509a).This picture of Socrates being tested by others, however, remains somewhat of an anomaly within Plato's cor pus; his fundamental role is to be the one who asks questions. In the Theaetetus Socrates notes that this is how he is commonly thought of and readily ties this view of him to his stance of ignorance: "The common reproach against me is that I am always asking questions of other people but never express my own views about anything, because there is no wisdom in me; and that is true enough.
And the reason of it is this, that God compels me to attend to the travail of others, but has forbid den me to procreate. So that I am not in any sense a wise man; I cannot claim as the child of my own soul any discovery worth the name of wisdom" (150c-d).
33. In his dissertation Kierkegaard assigns Socrates an essential role in the development of a proper speculative philosophy, but contends that he should only be conceived of as someone who prepares the way for speculative philosophy without himself becoming a speculative philosopher: "In the world-historical sense [Socrates'] significance was that he set the boat of speculation afloat__He himself, however, does not go on board but merely launches the ship. He belongs to an older for mation, and yet a new one begins with him" (Cl 217; SKS 1,261, trans. modified).
34. On the idea of Socrates' activity being a kind of preliminary cleansing of the soul, consider this passage from Plato's Sophist: "They set out to get rid of the belief in one's own wisdom in anoth er way. How? They cross-examine someone when he thinks he's saying something though he's say ing nothing. Then, since his opinions will vary inconsistently, these people will easily scrutinize him. They collect his opinions together during the discussion, put them side by side, and show that they conflict with each other at the same time on the same subjects in relation to the same things and in the same respects.The people who are being examined see this, get angry at themselves, and become calmer toward others [ideally speaking: cf. Ap. 23d]. They lose their inflated and rigid beliefs about themselves that way, and no loss is pleasanter to hear or has a more lasting effect on them. Doctors who work on the body think it can't benefit from any food that's offered to it until what's interfering with it from inside is removed.The people who cleanse the soul, my young friend, likewise think the soul, too, won't get any advantage from any learning that's offered to it until someone shames it by refuting it, removes the opinions that interfere with learning, and exhibits it cleansed, believing that it knows only those things that it does, and nothing more" (230b-d [italics mine]). By denying that Socrates' life should be understood as incomplete, Kierkegaard radicalizes this activity of cleansing the soul, insisting that this activity is never finished, never perfected but instead is of such a nature that an individual must conceive of it as a task to which she must devote her entire life.
35. Ap. 20e-21b.
36. Ap. 23a-b.
37. Kierkegaard's pseudonymous author Anti-Climacus puts it this way:"Let us never forget-but how many ever really knew it or thought it?-let us never forget that Socrates' ignorance was a kind of fear and worship of God, that his ignorance was the Greek version of the Jewish saying: The fear of the Lord is the beginning of wisdom. Let us never forget that it was out of veneration for God that he was ignorant, that as far as it was possible for a pagan he was on guard duty as a judge on the frontier between God and man, keeping watch so that the deep gulf of qualitative difference between them was maintained, between God and man, that God and man did not merge in some way, philosophice, poetice [philosophically, poetically] , etc., into one. That was why Socrates was the ignorant one, and that was why the deity found him to be the wisest of men" ( 39. This also arguably marks a difference between Kierkegaard and Socrates, for however isolated Kierkegaard is he still has the image and example of Socrates to help him maintain his bearings.
Personal outpourings of this sort also mark his writings as much more a product of modernity and the Christian tradition of confession than anything we find written about Socrates. The ancient accounts of Socrates don't really concern themselves with what we might call Socrates' inner life, and if as an experiment you were to try to imagine a sustained inner dialogue taking place within Socrates, I think you would quickly find the whole idea somewhat uncanny. In the Apology Socrates claims that he is the "same man" whether in public life or in private discussion: "Throughout my what a sober and temperate man he proves to be once you have looked inside. Believe me, it could n't matter less to him whether a boy is beautiful. You can't imagine how little he cares whether a person is beautiful, or rich, or famous in any other way that most people admire. He considers all these possessions beneath contempt, and that's exactly how he considers all of us as well. In pub lic, I tell you, his whole life is one big game-a game of irony. I don't know if any of you have seen him when he's really serious. But I once caught him when he was open like Silenus' statues, and I had a glimpse of the figures he keeps hidden within: they were so godlike-so bright and beauti ful, so utterly amazing-that I no longer had a choice-I just had to do whatever he told me" 41. But in doing so Kierkegaard clearly is not an easy act to follow; he seems to do everything so well himself. He composes intricate, existentially challenging texts and then proceeds to develop pow erful tools for reading and interpreting those texts. Anyone who wants to develop her own read ing must learn to be guided by his remarks without turning them into dogma, following them as long they keep the texts fresh and alive while not being afraid to jettison them when they seem to drain the texts of their vitality.
42. And to seek such an understanding, as I do, while inviting others to accompany one is to run the further risk of having one's moments of misunderstanding very much on display. As Kierkegaard's pseudonymous author Johannes Climacus puts it, "Anyone who begins to exercise himself in this understanding no doubt will frequently enough catch himself in a misunderstanding, and if he wants to become involved with others, he had better take care" (PF 102; SKS 4, 299). 46. Thanks to Bridget Clarke, Ben Eggleston, Robert Haraldsson, Brian Soderquist and Jon Stewart for helpful comments on an earlier draft of this paper.
